Civil Code and Related Subjects: Mineral Rights by Daggett, Harriet S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 10 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1948-1949 Term
January 1950
Civil Code and Related Subjects: Mineral Rights
Harriet S. Daggett
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Harriet S. Daggett, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Mineral Rights, 10 La. L. Rev. (1950)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol10/iss2/8
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
rate property might be recovered by the community from the
separate estate, if an enhanced value by virtue of the expendi-
ture could be shown at the time of dissolution of the community.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggett*
The case of State v. Evans' has been noted in this journal2
and, hence, a discussion of the material would be largely repeti-
tious.
The majority of the court in H. H. Transportation Company,
Incorporated v. Owens3 concurred with the finding of the district
judge "that Act No. 68 of 1942 did not contemplate nor did it
require recordation of a vendor's lien covering the sale of an en-
tire drilling rig which is moved into a parish for the drilling of
wells and that it contemplated only the furnishing of supplies
to a well already commenced. ' 4 Act 68 of 1942 reads: "That as to
movable property said vendor's lien and privilege must exist and
be filed for record within seven days after said property, subject
to the vendor's lien and privilege, is delivered to the well or
wells."5 Justice McCaleb did not subscribe to this view, finding
the section "clear and unambiguous" and the majority interpreta-
tion narrow, in that it failed to include the site within the words
"well or wells" and hence took the position that an entire rig
delivered before a well was commenced was not covered by Sec-
tion 2-B of the statute. Justice McCaleb's view seems the sound-
er one under the language of the statute, the intendment of the
legislature and the statutory history and trend in connection with
this and other legislation dealing with protection of laborers and
materialmen.
Ownership of royalty interests was involved in Continental
Oil Company v. Fuselier.6 The record owner had made a contract
under the terms of which he transferred his interest to another
person and himself as trustees for a corporation subsequently
to be formed. One of the provisions of the agreement was that
in case the corporation was not formed within ten years, the
trustees would cancel the contract. Since the condition was not
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 214 La. 472, 38 So.(2d) 140 (1948).
2. Note (1949) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIW 561.
3. 214 La. 985, 39 So.(2d) 441 (1949).
4. 214 La. 985, 991, 39 So.(2d) 441, 443 (1949).
5. La. Act 68 of 1942 [Dart's Stat's. (Supp. 1949) § 5101.6-5101.12].
6. 214 La. 1009, 39 So.(2d) 596 (1949).
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fulfilled, the agreement was dissolved and the "parties were re-
stored to the positions which existed prior to its confection." Ar-
ticles 2045, 2046, and 2047 were cited.
The question in Continental Oil Company v. Landry7 was
whether or not the doctrine of contiguous estates developed in the
law of mineral servitudes would apply in connection with royalty
per se as evolved in Vincent v. Bullock8 and subsequent cases.
Royalty had been sold on three non-contiguous tracts on August
21, 1935. The lands were leased in 1943. Production was obtained
preceding August 21, 1945, on one of the tracts. After August 21,
1945, production was obtained on another of the non-contiguous
tracts. The court held that the event, production, on the first
tract within the ten year period did not prevent the running
of prescription on the other tracts whereon production had not
occurred until after the ten year period. The court pointed out
that a royalty right having no user power is a lesser right than
that of servitude, and furthermore that the public policy of the
state would be adversely affected if royalty rights were permitted
to be held on non-contiguous estates by production on one.
The ownership of oil well equipment was in contest in Don-
nell v. Gray." The court found that the equipment had not been
abandoned by its owner as he had asserted ownership by selling
the property to the plaintiff less than nine months after he had
ceased to operate the well on defendant's land because the well
no longer produced in paying quantities. Furthermore, even con-
ceding that the original owner had abandoned the equipment,
defendant had not claimed the property as owner and hence did
not acquire it under Articles 2312 and 2313.
An interesting discussion of the meaning of the phrase "pro-
duction in paying quantities" appears in the case of Vance v.
Hurley.'0 The court reached the conclusion under the terms of
the lease involved that the quantity was a "paying" one and
hence refused to cancel the lease. Plaintiffs were awarded judg-
ment for a certain "production payment" promised as "an added
consideration for the execution of the lease.""
The principles of lesion 12 were applied to a "giving in pay-
ment" in Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston.18 In determining
7. 41 So.(2d) 73 (La. 1949).
8. 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
9. 41 So.(2d) 66 (La. 1949).
10. 41 So. (2d) 724 (La. 1949).
11. Id. at 728.
12. Art. 1861, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. 41 So.(2d) 811 (La. 1949).
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the value of the property in the condition that it was at the time
of the sale, the mineral value was very properly considered in
this case. That value was definitely proved, as leases had been
given by defendant less than a month after they had acquired
title to the property and other conclusive evidence was available.
Justice Hawthorne, dissenting on the application of lesion 14 rules
to a "giving in payment," expressed no opinion on the question of
considering mineral value in determining price.
The court overruled an exception of no cause of action in
Wier v. Grubb.'-' Under the provisions of the original lease and
the sublease, defendants were obligated to develop further the
lease, and the existence of one producing well did not satisfy this
clause. Under Act 205 of 1938,16 "remedial and procedural in
character,"' 7 a mineral lessee may protect or defend his interest
without the "concurrence, joinder, or consent of the landowner."',,
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Marriage
Marriage in Violation of Article 99. Article 92 of the Civil
Code forbids priests, ministers, and magistrates to officiate at
the marriage of males under eighteen years of age and females
under sixteen years of age. Four years ago this article was in-
terpreted to impose merely a prohibition against the celebration
of such marriages, but not to render null such marriages as might
be celebrated in violation of its provisions.' By Act 312 of 1948,
Article 99 of the Civil Code was amended to prohibit priests, min-
isters, and magistrates from celebrating marriages before seven-
ty-two hours had elapsed from the issuance of the marriage li-
cense. The language used in Article 99 as amended is similar to
that found in Article 92, and in In re State in Interest of Goodwin2
the supreme court applied to Article 99, by analogy, its previous
interpretation of Article 92.
14. Arts. 1862, 1863, La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. 41 So.(2d) 846 (La. 1949).
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 4735.4-4735.5.
17. 41 So.(2d) 846, 847 (La. 1949).
18. Ibid.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So. (2d) 837 (1946), discussed in Sym-
posium, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term
(1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 217 and noted in (1947) 7 LOUISIANA
LAW RBVIEW 442.
2. 214 La. 1062, 39 So. (2d) 731 (1949).
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